

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

CLASSICAL GREEK AND CLASSICAL CHINESE WARFARE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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This study is a comparative analysis of the warfare traditions of classical China and classical Greece. The first part of this study is designed to provide a framework for understanding how certain characteristics of a society's military tradition arise, and in particular, why certain aspects of the military traditions of classical China and classical Greece are dissimilar while other aspects are similar.

Specifically, chapter two demonstrates that the particular socio-political situation of a given state sets constraints upon the way that state can mobilize, organize, and employ a military force, and shows that intensive militant competition places a market incentive on a state to innovate and to select the most efficient defensive action options from the feasible set of possibilities. The third chapter suggests that the major differences in warfare character between classical Greece and China stem from the robust differences in the socio-political situations of the two societies.

The methodological approach for the second part, chapters four and five, is simple comparative analysis. Chapter four examines organizational differences of classical Greek and Chinese warfare—specifically differences related to armaments, force structures, and command and control elements. The subsequent chapter five examines the main differences relating to classical Greek and Chinese operational concepts.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (Comparative Classical Warfare)

KEYWORDS: Classical Warfare, Military Organization, Concepts of Operations

REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES FOR URBAN COMBAT

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Currently there exists no Joint doctrine to help commanders plan and coordinate the complex tasks of urban operations. Proposed Joint doctrine, JP3-06 DRAFT, attempts to alleviate this shortfall by providing commanders a framework and list of required operational capabilities to work with in the complex urban environment and states, "The complexity of urban terrain and the presence of noncombatants may combine to erode the effectiveness of current operational capabilities." The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relevance of the proposed Joint doctrine's required operational capabilities (ROC): Command, Control and

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Communications (C3); Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Fires; Maneuver; and Force Protection. The thesis attempts to determine if these are the key requirements for planning and executing successful urban operations. Successful combat operations are defined by doctrine as the fighting force maintaining a combat effective strength of seventy percent and the capability of conducting follow on missions. This thesis will analyze four case studies to determine the most critical elements for successfully planning and executing urban operations. It will then compare those elements against the proposed Joint doctrine's required operational capabilities in order to determine the relevance of the ROCs.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS: Command, Control, and Communications, Battlespace Environments

KEYWORDS: Urban Combat, MOUT, Grozny, Chechnya, IDF, Beirut, Suez City, JP3-06, Urban operations, Required Operational Capabilities

INSURGENCY IN URBAN AREAS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOF

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Many of the "small wars" that have occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War fit the profile of insurgent conflicts. They pit a constituted state vs. a counter-state. The counter-state relies on a support structure within the population, and the center-of-mass of these conflicts is political and psychological rather than military in nature. The urbanization boom in many underdeveloped countries has stretched the social services and infrastructure of the cities beyond the breaking point, and this dynamic may contribute to the occurrence of insurgency. Increasingly, political entrepreneurs have operated within urban areas to enlist disaffected individuals in campaigns of political conflict. This study argues that the most effective way to counter an insurgency is through a strategy of indirect approach that seeks to dismantle the insurgent support structures. The United States can support friendly governments that are combating insurgent violence through a "vertically integrated" advisory effort spearheaded by Special Operations Forces (SOF). These forces can assist a supported nation to develop a "counter-mobilization" framework that targets the *opportunity, means* and *motives* that allow an insurgency to exist. To attain success, the U.S. should exploit the insurgents' vulnerabilities, defeat their strategy and allow SOF to advise on intelligence collection activities.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Other (Special Operations)

KEYWORDS: Urban Insurgency, Counterinsurgency Operations, Colombia, Egypt, Chechnya

DEFINING DOD'S ROLE IN THE MARITIME INTERDICTION OF NBC/M (U)

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Maritime interdiction is one element of DOD's strategy to counter the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the means to deliver them (NBC/M). However, there exists neither an explicit policy nor a common framework for defining the conditions under which DOD would execute its maritime interdiction strategy. The result is that DOD has refined *how* it will interdict NBC/M at sea without defining *when* it would do so. Given the high stakes involved in a maritime military interdiction, without a clear policy, decisionmakers risk incurring high political costs, while DOD's strategy inefficiently allocates

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resources to the maritime proliferation problem. This thesis uses an analytical framework based on a simple decision model to identify and examine the key variables in a maritime interdiction decision. The relationship between these variables defines the set of conditions under which DOD is likely to interdict NBC/M at sea. This thesis also analyzes the policy implications, both within and above DOD, that result from defining those conditions.

DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA: Modeling and Simulation

KEYWORDS: Counterproliferation, Maritime Interdiction, Weapons of Mass Destruction, NBC/M

