

# MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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## **STREET SMARTS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS IN CONTEMPORARY JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS**

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U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has historically conducted Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the remote, rural, under-developed regions of the world. This thesis analyzes the relevance of UW to contemporary joint urban operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO). America's pre-eminence on the conventional battlefield, and the asymmetric advantages cities offer, should compel adversaries to engage us on urban terrain. Despite this observation, current doctrine inadequately prepares our forces for MOOTW or SASO in cities. Modernization efforts focus predominantly on improving high-intensity combat skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers. During MOOTW and SASO casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Unique capabilities, training, and experience conducting UW makes SF ideally suited for conducting JUO in this arena. A case study of U.S. involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the unique capabilities SF provides commanders, not otherwise available in the extant force structure. This thesis advocates using UW to counter urban, asymmetric threats, and concludes with a recommendation for developing amplifying doctrine for conducting UW in urban areas.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS:** Battlespace Environments, Other (Special Operations, Unconventional Warfare)

**KEYWORDS:** Joint Urban Operations (JUO), Unconventional Warfare (UW), MOUT, ARSOF, U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) Employment, Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability and Support Operations (SASO), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Joint Publication 3-06 (Draft)

## **COVER IN TRANSITION: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN OVERT, COVERT, AND CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES**

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This study examines how unlimited database access through Web-based search parameters and advances in information technologies have undermined the security of cover for individuals engaged in overt, covert, and clandestine activities.

This study examines how cover is formulated and details a sample risk analysis. It also examines identification documents and their use in crafting cover-legends. Then it explores the effects that Web-

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based informational databases have on establishing and maintaining cover; analyzes the present and future impact that information and biometric technologies have, and will have, on the employment of cover.

Finally, this thesis outlines four strategies for crafting successful cover: institutional processes; "legend" development; sustainable documentation; and travel practices.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS:** Other (Information, Operations)

**KEYWORDS:** Cover-legend, Identification Documents, Databases, Biometric Technologies, Strategies

### **THE REALIZATION OF INHUMANITY: THE TECHNOLOGY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) developed by non-state actors represent a serious potential threat to the United States. Current attempts at modeling both this threat and the doctrine to deal with this threat do not take into account the unique nature of specific types of WMD developed by and employed by non-state actors. This thesis addresses the problem of modeling WMD development according to supply-side variables that affect the potential, ability, and progress of groups to successfully realize their goals. In support of this, the thesis also reviews the technology, logistics, design challenges, and weaponization process specific to each type of WMD. These reviews form the technical basis for determination of the sets and subsets of supply variables and the relationships between them. Although assumptions have been made to simplify the process, in general these reviews offer a step-by-step "how-to" process for specific WMDs. These analyses serve two purposes: they demonstrate the degree to which, given open literature, a non-state actor may amass technology and resources in his developmental process and second, they provide data which substantiates the nomothetic sets discussed in the thesis.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Terrorism)

**KEYWORDS:** Weapon of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare

### **INNOVATION FROM BELOW: THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATE FEEDBACK IN IRREGULAR WARFARE OPERATIONS**

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Of the numerous variables that impact the outcome of irregular warfare operations, leadership is one of the most critical. Irregular operations require decentralization and the freedom of the local commander to create local solutions to the situations that he faces. These local solutions can have a dramatic and positive effect on the outcome of irregular military operations.

A review of cases that span a century of US irregular warfare operations provides evidence that, at times, the military hierarchy did allow subordinates to innovate and did listen to their recommendations, with positive outcomes as a result. This evidence also illustrates, however, that the military has failed to institutionalize these lessons and is prone to have to re-learn them from conflict to conflict, and at times this

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relearning process has resulted in the failure of an operation. Leaders must ensure that innovation and feedback are a part of the conduct of irregular warfare operations.

This thesis will illustrate that the doctrine and culture of the United States military does not provide for the systematic analysis and exploitation of subordinate innovation. The purpose of this thesis is to clearly articulate the important role that innovation and feedback from subordinates can have on the outcome of operations. The cases put forth to illustrate these points are the Philippines (1898-1902), Vietnam, and El Salvador. The goal is to draw conclusions and make recommendations on how the US military might better capture and utilize subordinate feedback and innovation in future operations.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Command, Control, Communications

**KEYWORDS:** Counterinsurgency, Irregular Warfare, Decentralized Operations, Subordinate Feedback, Innovation, Feedback Mechanisms, Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador

### UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC CONFLICT: A FRAMEWORK

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Within the last ten years the phrase ethnic conflict has become extremely common. I spent the majority of my time as a Special Forces Detachment Commander dealing with ethnic conflict situations in Northern Iraq, Turkey, and the Balkans. While in these places it became apparent to me that ethnic conflict is very complicated and that most Americans have a difficult time comprehending it. My purpose in writing this thesis is to offer Special Forces soldiers or other US military personnel a framework for gaining a better understanding of the dynamics involved in ethnic conflict. This framework includes three preconditions and two advanced conditions which are tested against three case studies: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kurdish/Turkish relations in Southeast Turkey. The framework offers an objective, non country-specific, way to sort through and make sense of the situation on the ground. After becoming familiar with this framework, it would be my hope that the individual will have the ability to function more effectively and efficiently, particularly when there is little time to become intimately familiar with the situation before arriving on the scene.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Conflict)

**KEYWORDS:** Ethnic Conflict, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kurds

### PROPERLY APPLYING THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT AND SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES

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The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current doctrine, applied effectively through the Military Decision Making Process, is more than adequate to the task of providing military planners the flexibility needed to develop plans and prosecute campaigns in the Low Intensity Conflict/Small Scale Contingency (LIC/SSC) arena.

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Most of the writing about the supposed inefficacy of our present doctrine deals with the *structure*, and “*mind-set*” of the military establishment. Suggested solutions presently range from fixing the problem through scaling down conventional units (currently reflected in the push for the medium brigade), to arguments made for flattening the present command infrastructure and adopting new doctrines made possible through the development of information warfare (IW) assets, capabilities, and technology.

We argue in this thesis that the problem, however, is not with the doctrine, but with its application. The change of mind we advocate would have the Army learn how to accomplish its tasks by applying the same tools but in a different way. We believe that the key to properly utilizing present doctrine lies in a three-fold solution incorporating information management, education, and training.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Low Intensity Conflict, Small Scale Contingencies)

**KEYWORDS:** Military Decision-Making Process, Low Intensity Conflict, Small Scale Contingencies, Doctrine, Culture