

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

THE FALLACY OF SINGLE SOURCE FIRE SUPPORT

David M. Aitken, Jr.-Major, United States Army

B.S., Lafayette College, 1990

Master of Science in Defense Analysis- June 2003

Advisor: Hy S. Rothstein, Department of Defense Analysis

Second Reader: David C. Tucker, Department of Defense Analysis

This thesis examines the reliance on air power for fire support by light forces and whether other fire support assets could perform these missions better. By studying the historical evolution of fire support, air power, and small wars doctrine, patterns emerge in how these developments interrelate. These patterns have led to a system that does not take advantage of some of the capabilities of other fire support assets, mainly artillery and mortars. The case of Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, highlights how light forces have come to depend on airpower. Could other forms of fire support have provided coverage that would have been more effective than the air support received? Light forces need to be aware that they have more choices for fire support than calling in air strikes and that artillery and mortars provide capabilities that air power cannot currently duplicate. Afghanistan demonstrated that artillery remains relevant. Even in a very permissive environment with few competing missions, there were times when air power could not provide the needed fire support to the ground maneuver forces.

KEYWORDS: Afghanistan, Air Power, Artillery, Fire Support

URBAN OPERATIONS: THEORY AND CASES

Gregory K. Anderson-Major, United States Army

B.S., United States Military Academy, 1991

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Ian C. Rice-Major, United States Army

B.A., Gettysburg College, 1991

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Advisors: John Arquilla, Department of Defense Analysis

Anna Simons, Department of Defense Analysis

This thesis examines military performance in both urban and traditional non-urban environments. Cases used in this study are German operations on the Russian front, Israeli operations during the Yom Kippur War, and U.S. Marine operations in South Vietnam. This thesis establishes a framework for analysis consisting of six factors. These include environment, time, informational aspects of military operations, application of existing technology, intangible human factors, and the decision-making of both political and military leaders. Analysis of the three cases points to a number of common trends, including shortcomings when units enter in the urban environment. A lack of urban operations training, an increase in time to accomplish tasks, a resistance to operate at night, difficulty processing and communicating information, and micro-management of city fighting by political and military leaders who typically refrain from such management during non-urban combat are noted. Results of this study suggest a need to incorporate consideration of these six factors into current doctrine.

KEYWORDS: Urban Operations Theory, Time, Information, Technology, Decision Making, Human Factors, Will and Morale, Stalingrad, Suez City, Hue

DEFENSE ANALYSIS

TIBET AND CHINA: HISTORY, INSURGENCY, AND BEYOND

Philip J. Barton-Major, United States Air Force

B.A., Syracuse University, 1987

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Advisor: Anna Simons, Department of Defense Analysis

Second Reader: David C. Tucker, Department of Defense Analysis

This thesis examines the history of insurgency in Tibet with an eye to the future. It offers background about the historical relations between Tibet and China in order to highlight why Tibet feels it is an independent country while China believes Tibet has always been an integral part of China. Next, the Tibetan insurgency against the Communist Chinese (1956-1974) is examined to determine reasons for its failure. The thesis then moves on to address Chinese measures taken to preclude a future Tibetan insurgency, including an analysis of those Chinese measures that have been successful and consideration of where conditions conducive to insurgency currently exist in Tibet. Finally, the conditions necessary for a successful future insurgency in Tibet are delineated.

KEYWORDS: Tibet, China, CIA, Insurgency, Guerrillas, Operation ST CIRCUS, Operation ST BARNUM, Dalai Lama, Chushi Gangdruk, Four Rivers, Six Ranges, Camp Hale

TERRORIST APPROACH TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Robert S. Earl-Major, United States Army

B.A., Washington University, 1989

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Norman E. Emery-Major, United States Army

B.A., Illinois State University, 1989

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-December 2003

Advisors: Dorothy Denning, Department of Defense Analysis

Raymond Buettner, Department of Information Science

This thesis provides insight into how terrorist organizations exploit the information environment to achieve their objectives. The study establishes an analytical Information Operations (IO) framework, by integrating U.S. military doctrine with a fundamental approach to IO theory. The framework proves useful in examining the IO tools terrorists have assembled and how they implement them to influence their target audiences. The thesis shows that terrorists are, indeed, naturally linked to the information environment by their nature and strategy. Generally speaking, all terrorists employ IO tactically to enhance their operations. However, many organizations have a profound understanding of the information environment and also have the ability to manipulate information to achieve their objectives. Since terrorist organizations are militarily weaker than the states they face and cannot rely on physical attacks to accomplish their goals, they must adopt an information strategy to achieve their objectives. This thesis emphasizes three primary conclusions: first, terrorists conduct violent attacks in the physical environment to enable operations in the information environment; second, terrorists integrate offensive and defensive IO to survive and appear legitimate to potential supporters and to the state; finally, terrorists intentionally target four different audiences (opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active) to psychologically influence their perceptions.

KEYWORDS: Information Operations, Information Warfare, Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence

DEFENSE ANALYSIS

AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTO A FIFTH SERVICE

**Philip L. Mahla-Major, United States Army
B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1991**

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

**Christopher N. Riga-Major, United States Army
B.A., Columbia College, 1987**

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Advisor: Anna Simons, Department of Defense Analysis

Second Reader: George Lober, Department of Defense Analysis

This thesis defines the strategic utility of Special Operation Forces (SOF), identifies why SOF only provide limited strategic utility, and presents an operational concept for the reorganization, alignment, and employment of SOF to overcome these shortfalls.

The thesis is presented in a deductive manner that argues that SOF were designed for strategic purposes, and leads the reader to conclude that reformation must occur for SOF to provide strategic utility and meet their intent. SOF would be in an optimal position to meet their organizational intent by becoming a fifth armed service within the Department of Defense (DoD). Through the creation of mission-based units and a holistic employment strategy, SOF would become a strategic instrument capable of assisting national decision-makers in blending the elements of national power.

Finally, the thesis concludes with additional required areas for research to make this concept become a reality, but that are beyond the scope of this study.

KEYWORDS: Strategic Utility, SOF in Afghanistan, Special Operation Forces Missions, Regional Commands, Special Operation Forces Employment, SOF as a Fifth Military Service

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO SHAPE FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS

**Ross H. Meyer-Major, United States Army
B.A., The Citadel, 1992**

Master of Science in Defense Analysis-June 2003

Advisor: Hy S. Rothstein, Department of Defense Analysis

Second Reader: Anna Simons, Department of Defense Analysis

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of how effective are current Special Operations Forces (SOF) theater engagement/security cooperation plans at supporting U.S. national interests. The examination of effectiveness focused on two theaters as case studies during the years 1998 through September 2001. This examination divided effectiveness into two parts. The first part was consistency. Consistency was investigated by a comparison of the national priorities to completed engagement activities. The second part of effectiveness attempted to measure gains produced through the executed engagement missions.

Following the case study analysis, key principles for effectiveness are identified and a modified engagement planning process proposed. The key elements of the modified process are integrated interagency planning, objective based engagement activities, and synchronization of all the elements of statecraft. This framework is tested by applying the modified TEP process to a sub-region of Africa. The significance for this test is not only to demonstrate the capability of the proposed TEP process. This test demonstrates the potential for effective engagement to assist in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In conclusion, this thesis provides an understanding of what engagement is today, and what engagement should be in the future. The principles of effective engagement planning identified herein should provide a framework for future planners.

KEYWORDS: Regional Engagement, Security Cooperation, SOF Global Scouts

