

# MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

---

## **ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND REDESIGN IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE DRUG WAR, NETWAR, AND OTHER LOWER-END CONFLICT**

**Alexander Berger, Captain, United States Air Force**

**B.A., University of New Hampshire, 1990**

**M.S., Troy State University, 1996**

**Master of Arts in National Security Affairs-March 1998**

**Advisors: John Arquilla, Information Warfare Academic Group**

**Scott D. Tollefson, Department of National Security Affairs**

The end of the Cold War and the rise of the Information Age have fostered an uncertain security environment which the United States is struggling to master. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the factors that lead complex organizations to initiate large-scale structural change in the face of environmental uncertainty; and more specifically to determine how the rise of the Information Age may change the organizational requirements of the U.S. national security structure. This thesis creates a unique framework for analysis, blending principles of organization and innovation theory with the theory of information-based “netwar.”

This study analyzes the organizational structures adopted by several transnational drug cartels and compares them to that of U.S. counternarcotics forces. Next, this thesis reviews a series of recent occurrences pertaining to national security to test whether there are manifestations of netwar threats emerging and whether new and old organizational actors are learning to adapt their structures to gain an advantage over the United States.

Finally, this thesis is both predictive and prescriptive with regard to the issues of organizational redesign. It argues that structural changes are necessary for the United States to ensure the national security in an Information Age. Then it makes recommendations that would help the U.S. security structure redesign itself to become more agile in the face of Information Age threats.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS:** Battlespace Environments, Command, Control, and Communications

**KEYWORDS:** Organizational Redesign, Information Warfare, Drug War, Innovation, Inter-Service Coordination, Netwar

## **GERMANY’S IRAN POLICY: BEYOND “CRITICAL DIALOGUE”**

**Mark A. Gerschoffer-Lieutenant, United States Navy**

**B.A, San Diego State University, 1987**

**Master of Arts in National Security Affairs-March 1998**

**Advisor: Donald Abenheim, Department of National Security Affairs**

**Second Reader: James J. Wirtz, Department of National Security Affairs**

Germany and the United States differ in their approach to Iran. While the United States seeks to contain Iran through diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, Germany prefers to influence Iran through diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation.

German foreign policy posits that its policy of constructive engagement is the most effective way to influence another country’s behavior. This notion has its origins in the Cold War. In 1963, the idea of a “policy of small steps” leading to

---

## MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

---

“change through rapprochement” inspired the policy of *Ostpolitik*. The basic principles of *Ostpolitik* were continued from 1969 through the end of the Cold War. It is widely believed in Germany that the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany were due not to the success of containment, but to détente and *Ostpolitik*.

Given this policy perspective, Germany considers the political and economic costs of sanctions to be unacceptably high. In addition to the loss to commercial interests, sanctions would affect Germany’s overall credibility as a trading state. Moreover, political demands which might be suspect because of Germany’s past are translated into more respectable economic demands. Economic sanctions would limit Germany’s ability to pursue its political objectives.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Foreign Policy)

**KEYWORDS:** Germany, Iran, German Foreign Policy, German-Iranian Relations, Critical Dialogue

**DRAGON IN THE SHADOWS:  
CALCULATING CHINA’S ADVANCES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA**  
Michael W. Studeman-Lieutenant, United States Navy  
B.A., College of William and Mary, 1988  
Master of Arts in National Security Affairs-March 1998  
Advisors: Solomon M. Karmel, Department of National Security Affairs  
Edward A. Olsen, Department of National Security Affairs

The dispute between at least six riparian nations over jurisdictional rights to large tracts of the South China Sea continues to reign as one of the most likely flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific theater. The intentions of the chief protagonist in the conflict, China, will in large measure determine whether this dilemma will be resolved peacefully or violently. Relying on three case studies that focus on China’s takeover of the Paracel Islands in 1974, its occupation of six reefs in 1988, and subsequent reef-hopping incidents in 1992 and 1995, this study highlights the conditions under which China expanded its presence in the South China Sea. Based on emerging trends, this thesis asserts that resource competition will most likely spark future violence in the South China Sea, and that domestic pressures within China commit Beijing to a course of hardshell revanchism. At the same time, regional sensitivities to Chinese “hegemony” and the correlation of military forces that weakly favor China suggest China will strive to avoid or contain a conflict over the near term. By profiling the character and timing of past Chinese “aggression” in the South China Sea, this thesis also exposes the stratagems by which Chinese armed forces have pursued national objectives in the region.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (International Jurisdictional Rights)

**KEYWORDS:** South China Sea, China, Revanchism

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS**

---