

# MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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## **BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND THE IRA: THE SECRET WAR IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-1988**

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**Master of Arts in National Security Affairs-March 1999**

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The British Army was sent to Northern Ireland in 1969 as a peacekeeping force between the Catholic and Protestant communities. Against a backdrop of sectarian violence, emerging paramilitary organizations began to contest British authority throughout the province. Peace operations then evolved into counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. As the mission of the British Security Forces changed, the role of British intelligence became increasingly important. This thesis is a history of British intelligence operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from 1969 to 1988. It critically examines the role of the British intelligence community in Northern Ireland and focuses on the major intelligence agencies that participated in the war against the IRA. The tradecraft of British intelligence is analyzed, particularly the use of informers as the primary vehicle of information about the IRA. Four representative operations conducted by British intelligence are presented as historical case studies and illustrate covert intelligence collection, propaganda operations, clandestine penetration, and the involvement of intelligence in so-called "shoot-to-kill" incidents. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the uneasy relationship between Britain's aggressive intelligence community and the democracy that it serves.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Counter-Terrorism)

**KEYWORDS:** British Intelligence, Northern Ireland, Irish Republican Army, Counter-Terrorism

## **WHEN SUKARNO SOUGHT THE BOMB: INDONESIAN NUCLEAR ASPIRATIONS IN THE MID-1960s**

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Proponents of nuclear nonproliferation, such as the United States, seek to develop policies that address the root causes of nuclear proliferation. The discipline of international relations aids in this effort by providing theories that attempt to explain why states choose to build nuclear weapons. Most theories simplify the process of proliferation by using only one of three generally accepted explanations: security, domestic politics, or norms. The case of Indonesia, however, illustrates that proliferation is best explained by investigating all three dimensions as well as the role of technology.

This thesis evaluates competing theories of nuclear proliferation using a historical case study of Indonesia's aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons during 1964-1965, and supports the view that multiple variables are necessary to explain the spread of nuclear weapons. As evidence, this thesis examines Indonesian President Sukarno's little-known nuclear aspirations in the mid-1960s. Although Sukarno was ultimately unsuccessful in his effort to acquire atomic weapons, his decision to seek them was influenced by a variety of factors that included Indonesia's security needs domestic political considerations, norms, and available nuclear energy technology.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction)

**KEYWORDS:** Indonesia, Sukarno, Nuclear Proliferation, Nonproliferation

**THE MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM:  
A RENAISSANCE IN TRANS-ATLANTIC ARMAMENTS COOPERATION?**

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The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) is the only theater missile defense system being developed within NATO to defend forward-deployed maneuver forces and NATO territory from theater ballistic missile attack. To gain the extra funding needed to keep this expensive TMD system alive, and to improve its reputation for reliability in Alliance weapon programs, the United States convinced NATO Europe that MEADS would be the model for triggering a “renaissance in armaments cooperation.” To NATO Europe, however, MEADS became a litmus test of America’s credibility as a future armaments partner. MEADS’ European partners threatened to end armaments cooperation and pursue a policy of European self-sufficiency, which might undermine NATO’s cohesion, if MEADS should fail because of U.S. political and bureaucratic interests.

This thesis examines U.S. and European decision-making dynamics concerning whether MEADS becomes the model for future trans-Atlantic armaments cooperation or the impetus for fragmenting NATO cohesion. It concludes that the West’s common strategic interest in maintaining stability on the European continent and in countering the increasing menace from the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles will prevent a failed MEADS from threatening the near-term viability of the fifty year old trans-Atlantic alliance.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREAS:** Conventional Weapons, Other (Ballistic Missile Defense, Cruise Missile Defense)

**KEYWORDS:** Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Theater Missile Defense (TMD), Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Trans-Atlantic Armaments Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

**FORGING A PATH TO PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:  
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

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A collapse of North Korea poses the single greatest threat to peace and stability in East Asia. A violent collapse, known as a “hard landing” would be a costly disaster. A more benign collapse, or “soft landing,” while less disruptive, requires a level of sustained North Korean economic growth and South Korean investment not possible under current economic conditions. Even if North Korea were somehow able to execute a soft landing and reunify with the South, huge societal differences exist between the two Koreas that would make the process more costly and difficult than that experienced by other divided nations. In response, this thesis states that the primary goal of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia should be to prevent a collapse of North Korea, and proposes a combination of confidence building measures, economic aid, and diplomatic engagement calculated to drive North Korea towards re-engagement with the outside world and increased interdependence with South Korea. The primary aim of these policies is to promote peace and stability in the region, while paving the way for reconciliation. Reunification is treated as a domestic issue to be resolved by the two Koreas at some future date.

**DoD KEY TECHNOLOGY AREA:** Other (National Security Affairs)

**KEYWORDS:** East Asia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Republic of Korea (ROK), Foreign Policy, Engagement, Agreed Framework, Sunshine Policy, Hard Landing, Soft Landing