

THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN

For 'Shock and Awe' Author, Concern

By DAVID VON DREHLE
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Two months ago, "shock and awe" was just a complex and slightly vague notion from the abstruse world of military eggheads. Now, the phrase is on tongues and TV screens around the world, serving as a virtual marquee for boom and blast in Baghdad.

Along the way, a lot was lost in the translation—to the chagrin of many American generals who say the phrase gives the wrong impression of what they are trying to do.

Even Harlan Ullman, one of the principal authors of "Shock and Awe," a dense tome written in 1996, said yesterday he is sorry to see what has become of his catchy phrase. True, he is all over television and the Internet, but not without reservations.

"It will be bad public relations for the United States," he said. "Clearly, there will be people who want to take it out of context and say we are trying to terrorize the Iraqi people. That we are threatening to do to them what we did to the people of Hiroshima."

If some people say that, it is because Ullman himself has made the comparison. "Theoretically," he and co-author James P. Wade wrote, "the magnitude of Shock and Awe . . . seeks to impose (in extreme cases) is the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese." In another passage, the authors conjured up the image of glassy-eyed veterans of the World War I trenches.

For this, Ullman is identified by some antiwar groups as the "Dr. Strangelove" of the Iraq war.

The authors could not have known that they were coining a name for history's first made-for-TV war. The theory of "shock and awe" began as an attempt to answer

a question that dominated defense intellectuals in the 1990s: how to maintain U.S. military strength in the post-Cold War era of declining military budgets?

Working with a small grant from the National Defense University, Ullman and Wade gathered commanders from the 1991 Persian Gulf War to talk about how they might have achieved the same victory in less time and with fewer forces.

Wade was a former undersecretary of defense. Ullman was a Naval Academy graduate and Vietnam veteran whose students at the National War College had included a young Army colonel named Colin L. Powell. "Ullman," Powell once wrote, "was that rarity, a scholar in uniform . . . possessed of one of the best, most provocative minds I have ever encountered."

As it turned out, the military principle dominating U.S. strategy in the mid-'90s was "the Powell Doctrine," which held that the United States should go to war only with overwhelming force. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1990, Ullman's former student put his doctrine into practice in the Gulf War, marshalling a half-million troops to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Ullman, Wade and their panelists envisioned a now-familiar world in which rogue states threatened U.S. security with weapons of mass destruction, and wondered if there might be a way to defeat them without the slow and expensive build-up of forces that Powell had applied in the Gulf War.

What they came up with was "shock and awe" to achieve "rapid dominance."

"The idea," Ullman said yesterday from the back of a sedan on the way to his next interview, "is to crack the enemy's will as quickly as possible."

This can be achieved in many ways—in fact, it is probably best achieved by a blitz of activity. Some of the tac-

tics are purely psychological, such as campaigns of deception, propaganda and disinformation. Some of the tactics work on the mind more violently. To borrow a phrase from the 1996 book: "very selective, utterly brutal and ruthless and rapid application of force to intimidate."

In this sense, the Thursday morning strike against Hussein's bunker was "a classic example of shock and awe if it worked," Ullman said.

The theory also contemplated overwhelming strikes to knock out electricity, water supplies and other necessities in an effort to break the will of civilians to resist. So far, U.S. planners have not taken such steps in Iraq.


Successfully applied, Ullman said, shock and awe can save lives: "You get them to quit before they die."

The phrase entered the consciousness of America's television news producers late in January, after CBS quoted an unnamed Pentagon source using "shock and awe" to describe the emerging plan for Iraq. One database of news reports from around the world reveals a few dozen uses of the phrase in January, a couple of hundred in February and early March, and more than 600 in the past week.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper recently dismissed the phrase in an interview, saying it had not been used in formulating the air campaign for Iraq. Some military analysts in Washington said yesterday that it may have been dangled before the press as a part of the months-long campaign to demoralize Iraqi troops and citizens before the war.

But whether the stern and chilling phrase actually shaped American strategy or is just superpower trash talk, there is no erasing it from the world's heated debate over U.S. actions.

"I'm a piñata for the antiwar forces," Ullman complained, as he prepared for his next interview.



BY JENNIFER DOMENICK FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Harlan Ullman, co-author of "Shock and Awe," fears some misconstrue the phrase's meaning. "The idea is to crack the enemy's will as quickly as possible," he said.

The war in Iraq has led us from despair to euphoria. The sight last week of jubilant Iraqi citizens welcoming U.S. and coalition forces into Baghdad was visually exceeded only by the tearing down of a large statue of Saddam Hussein. Huge sighs of relief from the White House and 10 Downing Street over the response, justifying for the moment the aim of liberation, were practically audible. Contrast that with the bleaker reports of stiffer-than-expected Iraqi resistance and highly vulnerable, lengthy supply lines of earlier weeks.

The war is not over, as the White House and Pentagon wisely cautioned. Yet, at this point, there are several irrefutable points. The administration remained fixed in aim and unwavering in purpose. Prevail they would, and



Members of the House of Representatives at a rally supporting the troops.

they have almost done so.

The performance of American, British and Australian fighting men and women has been spectacular — perhaps too tame a description. Not only have they destroyed the Iraqi army's ability to fight, but they have done so with nobility and humanity. Avoiding casualties and excess damage was the mantra; so far, it has been done exceedingly well.

Congress, where art thou?

Lawmakers need to ask some tough questions

Finally, everyone recognizes that the more difficult task lies ahead. Coalition forces must now mop up or defeat the remaining resistance in pockets and cities such as Tikrit, Saddam's home. Law and order must be established — not only to prevent looting, but to limit any reprisals. All the necessary parts of a functioning civil society must be restored or created, ranging from basic human needs for food, water and shelter to a working currency and means for

one other ingredient that so far is missing in action.

Where is the Congress in all of this? Two and a quarter centuries ago, the remarkable group of Americans who put this nation together drafted our Constitution. It was not by accident that the very first article of that document laid out the basis for the legislature. The executive was reserved for Article II.

Clearly, times have changed. But Congress still has a role that should be not less than co-equal with the presidency. Yet, where is Congress? Consider just a few items.

When President Bush went to Congress for authorization to use force if necessary to disarm Saddam of mass-destruction weapons he might or not have, the White House was aware that North Korea had already disclosed to senior U.S. officials that it had not ceased its nuclear-weapons programs, and indeed might possess a few. That information was not fully disclosed to Congress. Perhaps members might be interested in learning why.

Next, senior members of Congress say privately that while they had received personal assurances by members of the administration that Iraq did indeed possess WMD, no irrefutable evidence was directly presented to that body as a whole. And, while the administration has worked out what seem to be elaborate plans for postwar rehabilitation of Iraq, Congress has played at best a modest role in that process.

Congress, of course, has powers and responsibility for oversight and for approving all federal spending.

Members of Congress might consider then how, in the most constructive way, they can play a role as co-equal partners in winning the peace. Congress might begin by crafting legislation on the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. Some will argue that is an error. Any legislation would become too politicized and bog down.

Perhaps. However, since it is not yet clear how the United Nations, other countries and organizations such as NATO and the European Union will be involved, Congress might be helpful.

Legislation that convenes an international peace conference on Iraq is a good start.

Next, Congress should examine benefits for survivors and spouses of those service personnel killed in action. Families of victims of the September 11th horror were awarded millions of dollars in compensation. Families of police and firefighters who die in the line of duty are awarded, by federal law, a quarter of a million dollars.

While service personnel can elect to take out a \$250,000 life-insurance policy, if killed in action, their families and survivors receive what are very modest benefits at best. This lack of equity must be redressed.

Congress did not play much of a role in the war. But, for the peace to be successful, Congress must act differently. The example of the failed Versailles Treaty after World War I aside, the Founding Fathers knew what they were doing. Let us hope we do, too.

Owls and eagles



Harlan Ullman

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Samson's security shadows

For five decades, America's security structure has rested on four pillars. At various times, each pillar has come under attack. But, this is the first time that simultaneous pressures threaten to dismantle the whole structure. The risk of collapse is real. And there are no replacement structures in sight.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. security was anchored on three regional pillars — NATO, Europe; North East Asia; the Middle East and Persian Gulf — and on sustaining the world's strongest economy. NATO always seemed at a perpetual crossroads tested by wars in the Middle

East, America's Vietnam agony, deployment of nuclear cruise missiles to Europe in the early 1980s and Soviet armed incursions from Eastern Europe to Afghanistan.

Despite conflict in Korea and Vietnam, Northeast Asia was made a safe and strong pillar by a combination of U.S. military presence and a series of bilateral agreements with Japan, South Korea and, much later, with China. Despite war and violence, the need for affordable access to the world's largest source of oil, checking Soviet and later Iraqi aggression and guaranteeing America's commitment to Israel kept the Middle East and Persian Gulf pillar strong. Energized by World War II, the American economy was a seemingly inexhaustible pillar for growth and prosperity.

Three circumstances explain why the risk of dismantlement is real. First was the demise of the Soviet Union. Second was September 11, 2001. And third is how the United States responds to those horrific attacks for the long term.

For NATO, the Soviet threat was

the glue that held the alliance together containing even the most disruptive centrifugal forces. Worldwide, Soviet power encouraged states to side with the United States to counter or exploit that threat. Those days are gone.

September 11 ushered in a new and frightening world. America was no longer immune to terror attack and indeed was very vulnerable to it. NATO quickly declared the attack as one against the alliance and joined the United States in the global war on terror. With the rapid routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the outpouring of sympathy for September 11, American prestige and influence were riding high.

Then, the Bush administration's sights shifted to Iraq. Deposing Saddam Hussein became the next step in defeating terror. Mr. Bush's challenge that "you are with us or against us" and the initial indifference to seeking support for an Iraqi intervention from Congress and the United Nations provoked criticisms of American "arrogance" and "unilateralism" undermining credibility and support.

One consequence of Mr. Bush's determination to disarm Saddam Hussein "sooner rather than later" has surprisingly cast the U.S. as the bully and prompted several "clashes of civilizations." This confrontation is not between the West and Islam as Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington predicted. Instead, one clash is between the Western democracies in Europe and the United States. A second clash is in the U.N. And surely the impact on the Middle East security pillar will be profound.

All but three NATO governments support the U.S. But the overwhelming majority of Europeans oppose war at this point. NATO will not survive this tension without major and probably fundamental conse-

quence. The bulk of world opinion disagrees with the administration's call for urgency in disarming Saddam. The U.N. reflects this disposition. Thus, the Bush administration could conclude the U.N. is irrelevant for not siding with us.

In Northeast Asia, no doubt exploiting America's fixation on Iraq, North Korea's belligerent nuclear diplomacy and the administration's response have turned things topsy-turvy. In South Korea, public attitudes regard the United States more unfavorably than the north and its "Dear Leader," Kim Jung-il. The Japanese defense minister has raised the prospect of "pre-emptive" strikes to prevent any imminent North Korean attack, and some Americans are suggesting that Japan should become a nuclear power, extraordinary transformations with consequences likely to prove more harmful than helpful.

Meanwhile, the U.S. economy stumbles along. The administration's economic and tax plan was not supported by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve. The inability or unwillingness of the administration to estimate the costs of war with Iraq and what war will mean for that vital region has weakened credibility and the case for action. War might precipitate a steep if not precipitous economic downturn. But the most obvious risk is the uncertainties accompanying conflict and the unpredictable impact they will have on markets and economic conditions.

A rapid, decisive and inexpensive victory over Saddam could neutralize these forces and fears. Yet, there are reasons for worry. The pillars of U.S. security risk dismantlement. Until the Bush administration recognizes what is at stake and acts to reinforce or replace these pillars, the tale of a blind Samson bringing down the Philistine temple will not go away.

Harlan Ullman is a columnist for The Washington Times whose next book is titled "An American Samson in the Temple: Winning the War without Collapsing the Peace."

